Michigan Law Review
Volume 98

Issue 6

2000

On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of
Order
Owen D. Jones
Arizona State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, Law and Society
Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2072 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol98/iss6/29

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ON THE NATURE OF NORMS:
BIOLOGY, MORALITY, AND
THE DISRUPTION OF ORDER
Owen D. Jones*
THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITU
TION OF SOCIAL ORDER. By Francis Fukuyama. New York: The
Free Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 354. $26

The analysis of where norms come from is colored by the strong ideo
logical preferences people have as to where they ought to come from. [p.
189]
For a long time - and through the now-quaint division of disci
plines - morals and norms have been set apart from other behavior
biasing phenomena. They have also been set apart from each other.
Morals are generally ceded in full to philosophers. Norms have been
ceded to sociologists.
In retrospect, it is not clear why this should be so. Reality is noto
riously impervious to taxonomy, and the axis supposedly distinguish
ing morals from other norms is, after all, arbitrary. Moreover,
behavior-biasing phenomena interact in important ways, making the
study of parts - without more - just the study of parts. But one
thing is clear. To the extent that understanding morals and norms is
important to law, studying the two apart from other behavior-biasing
phenomena creates a problem.
This problem arises because of opportunity costs. Whenever a
topic - such as morality - is both relevant to law and without a
uniquely legal theoretical foundation, legal thinkers must rely (at least
initially) on disciplines claiming expertise. But in a world in which the
academy has divided reality into disciplinary slices - which, having
once been sundered, are neither differently divisible nor easily recom
bined - there is an ever-present risk to law of disciplinary capture.
As, for example, when legal thinkers may too hastily elevate the pro-
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nouncements of one discipline, perhaps the one most hypertrophied or
shouting loudest, over another.
The costs of such disciplinary capture increase according to the
value that foregone knowledge from another discipline would have of
fered. And in today's world, in which knowledge accumulates at an
ever-quickening pace, these opportunity costs climb faster than ever
before, making each choice about where to turn for insights on human
behavior fraught with consequence. To disciplines like law, in par
ticular, charged with practical matters of great human importance, the
costs of foregoing useful knowledge can be affirmatively harmful, not
just intellectually embarrassing.
As consumers and appliers of knowledge from other disciplines,
legal thinkers should play - indeed should feel obligated to play - a
far more active role in furthering interdisciplinary integration of sub
jects relevant to law. Of course, the inevitable limits on the accumula
tion of individual expertise make it endlessly tempting for even the
most talented and committed interdisciplinary thinkers in the legal
academy to mine a single disciplinary vein (economics or cognitive
psychology, for example) to its maximum depths. There are econo
mies of scale. And many great and useful insights can be and have
been gained thereby. But the common isolation of our proliferated
disciplinary mineshafts from even near neighbors often forecloses the
important and available benefits that broad, cross-connective integra
tion could provide. Put simply, scholars of various disciplines often
work to solve the same problems, unaware that their efforts are
closely paralleled by those with whom intellectual trade would yield
mutual gains.
Such is the case with morals and norms. To the extent that legal
thinkers have in fact recently begun to move beyond philosophy and
sociology for more information, they have turned primarily to eco
nomics, psychology, and game theory. But even this happy develop
ment remains an incomplete achievement (reflecting, as it does, a la
tent tendency to elevate the social sciences over the life sciences,
rather than partnering them). Behavioral biology has at least as much
to offer to the study of morality and norms as these other disciplines,
perhaps more. Many primatologists, behavioral ecologists, ethologists,
neuroanatomists, and behavioral geneticists have long studied the ori
gins of and patterns in, for example, human and nonhuman coopera
tion and altruism, reciprocity and hostility, division of labor, sharing of
production, and identification and treatment of cheaters on social
norms. Their work has sound theoretical foundations, and is empiri
cally robust. Without the contributions of behavioral biologists to the
study of morals and norms, legal thinkers risk errors that are harmful,
not just intellectually embarrassing.
Why can we state this with confidence? Because: a) law is funda
mentally about levering human behavior in directions it might not go
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on its own; b) law's fulcrum in this effort is its model of where behav
ior comes from; and c) behavior is fundamentally a biological phe
nomenon. Consequently, any model of behavior inconsistent with the
foundations of modern behavioral biology is inaccurate and obsolete.
(Or else the unheralded ferment of a true intellectual and scientific
revolution.) And thus legal approaches to understanding and influ
encing human behavior that are based on outdated behavioral models
are simply less likely to effect socially and legally desirable outcomes
than might be the case if the behavioral models were more conceptu
ally robust.
This should hardly be surprising. The centrality of biology to un
derstanding human behavior is not just a matter of academic accesso
rizing. Biology is not just another "and" at the "Law and--" buffet,
to be sampled at convenience, when tastes turn. Biology is truly foun
dational, having both broad and practical relevance at a completely
different level of analysis than, say, economics or sociology. For just
as theories of chemistry must be consistent, in the end, with theories of
physics - and theories of biology must be consistent, in turn, with
theories of chemistry and physics - theories of economics, sociology,
psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and all the rest must be consis
tent, in the end, with the basic principles of biology.
The most basic principle of biology, in turn, is evolution - par
ticularly evolution by natural selection. Natural selection occurs in
any system in which there is differential reproductive success as a
function of heritable variation. Put simply, any population of replica
tors, in which variations in heritable traits affect future replicative suc
cess, will tend, over generations, to accumulate an increasing propor
tion of traits that contribute to replicative success.1
The power of this deceptively simple insight - and its ultimate
relevance to law - lies in its ability to explain not only species-typical
patterns of form, but also species-typical patterns of behavior. (Or
what some people term a species-typical nature. ) More specifically,
natural selection shapes the physical and chemical information
processing pathways of the brain in ways that have tended, over time,
to contribute to the survival and reproductive success of organisms
that bear them. These information-processing pathways yield behav
ioral predispositions. Of which, to circle back, morals and norms are a
subset.
Francis Fukuyama understands all this.2 He has written an exu
berantly creative, thorough, and highly stimulating book on the rela
tionship between political and economic order on one hand, and social

1. See generally sources cited infra note 27.
2. Francis Fukuyama is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at
George Mason University.
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and moral order, on the other. Specifically, he argues that under
standing the human future requires us to see underappreciated con
nections between politics, economics, law, social order, morals, norms,
and biology. It is a big task. For Fukuyama undertakes nothing less,
in The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of
Social Order, than to identify recent patterns in social order and dis
order, to offer novel explanations for their origins, and to make pre
dictions about what will happen next. But Fukuyama has never been
one to shy away from big tasks. (His prior works include, for example,
the ambitiously titled The End of History and the Last Man.3) And in
The Great Disruption, true to his subtitle, Fukuyama ambitiously en
lists the life sciences, integrating them with social sciences, in aid of a
deeper understanding of human behavior and morality, and in fur
therance of political science analysis.4 His message is synthetic, ex
planatory, predictive, and in the end, consoling. His methods are, for
legal thinkers and others, engaging, instructive, and sometimes cau
tioning.
I.

CONTEXT

Fukuyama's major hurdle, in arguing for the relevance of life sci
ence perspectives on human morality, is context. His contextual
problem extends past disciplinary divisions to the history of science
itself. Beyond the endlessly important but by now cliche observation
that bad things have been done in the name of good science, lies an
even deeper resistance to his effort. For we can view the march of the
science he invokes as, in many ways, leading a steady retreat from
human uniqueness.
Time and again, through history, we have developed a perfectly
plausible way of viewing our place on the planet. It comports with our
preferences for the way the world ought sensibly to operate. It con
forms to our convictions. It makes us feel special in the dark danger
ous night. And then along comes some flag-waver like Fukuyama,
preaching the scientific virtues of parsimony and falsification, who
shoots our favored theories full of holes. Constructive or destructive?
It depends on where you happen to be standing at the time. Progress
is less preferable when progress threatens prominence.
3. FRANCIS F'uKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
Fukuyama's subsequent book, TRUST: THE S OCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995), provides an equally ambitious argument that trust is the underappreci
ated linchpin of economic prosperity.
4. His efforts in this regard parallel that of legal thinkers, employing evolutionary analy
sis in law, who enlist life science perspectives in furtherance of existing legal goals. For in
formation on the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), see <http://www.
sealsite.org>. For sources exploring the utility to law of integrating biological perspectives,
see infra note27.
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And science has, one must admit, served up steady threats to our
prominence. When Copernican reasoning ultimately exposed as false
our belief that Earth was the physical center of everything, we re
treated to the less bold claim that at least, and after all, we among all
life sprang full-blown from time, in full modern form, as the direct,
special, and unchanged-from-the-beginning creation of a supernatural
power. Theoretically possible - until Darwin shrank the probability
toward zero.
Thereafter, we retreated into successively more humble claims to
uniqueness.5 First, we were the only tool users. But that didn't work.6
Then we restaked the boundaries of uniqueness, imagining that we
and we alone were capable of culture - the intergenerational and
non-genetic transmission of novel information or forms of behavior.
But that has proved to be equally incorrect.7 Our latest, perhaps last,
retreat therefore stakes the once imperialistic boundaries of human
uniqueness ever closer to home - surgically dividing the moral from
the amoral, with us in one camp, and all other life in another. If the
physicists, chemists, biologists, anatomists, paleontologists, and as
tronomers can provide us few comforts in an expansive human
uniqueness, then surely the philosophers can afford us safe and sole
haven within moraled walls.
Francis Fukuyama apparently does not think so. For he grounds
his argument, in The Great Disruption, on theory and evidence that
modern human morality reflects the relentless influence of natural se
lection.8 He is not the first to argue that morality cannot be fully un-

5. All species are unique, of course, by definition. But we have generally preferred to
believe, pace Orwell, that some species are more unique than others, and that our own
uniqueness is - well - unique.
6. Species as diverse as chimpanzees and crows have demonstrated the abilities not only
to use tools, but to fashion them from raw materials. See, e.g., Yukimaru Sugiyama, Tool
Use by Wild Chimpanzees, 367 NATURE 327 (1994); Gavin R. Hunt, Manufacture and Use of
Hook-Tools by New Caledonian Crows, 379 NATURE 249 {1996).
7. A recent study addressing all accumulated reports of chimpanzee cultural transmis
sion made patent that we are not alone within the boundaries we have staked (at least so
long as we avoid conveniently ad hoc definitions of culture that might require, for example,
the painting of still lifes in acrylic). See Frans B. M. de Waal, Cultural Primatology Comes of
Age, 399 NATURE 635 {1999); A. Whiten et al., Cultures in Chimpanzees, 399 NATURE 682
(1999).
8. To be sure, it is a grand mistake to think (as many apparently do) that the biology of
behavior is about genes for this behavior or that, present in some portion of the population
and absent elsewhere. As will be discussed further below, cutting edge behavioral biology
incorporates far more important, far subtler, far more flexible, and far less reductionistic
influences on behavior than that. Nonetheless, population-wide patterns in moral senti
ments are predictably consistent with the knowable effects of evolutionary processes on the
human mind. As Arnhart puts it, "Human beings have a natural moral sense that emerges
as a joint product of moral emotions such as sympathy and anger and moral principles such
as kinship and reciprocity," as a function of evolutionary history. LARRY ARNHART,
DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT: THE BIOLOGICAL ETHICS OF HUMAN NATURE 7 (1998).
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derstood without a biological foundation (as he would be the first to
point out).9 But where Fukuyama makes important original contribu
tions is in his willingness to explore several possible implications, for
tomorrow's questions about the human future, of evolution's effects
on human morality. This Review will discuss the principal implica
tions Fukuyama sees, and suggest several others in the legal arena.

What are morals, after all, but information-processing patterns that tend to bias behavior
in this way rather than that way? If those information-processing patterns tend to bias be
havior in similar ways, on average, across a species, in contexts likely to be long encountered
throughout evolutionary history, they are likely to be the subject of selection pressures,
which favor some outcomes more than others, and thus favor psychological mechanisms
leading to adaptive responses more than others. To the extent these are even slightly herita
ble, the historically more adaptive psychological predispositions will tend to predominate
over the less adaptive ones.
For a discussion of recent work attempting to locate moral information processing
within particular portions of the human brain, see, for example, Steven W. Anderson et al.,

Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032 (1999); and Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology
of Morals, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 927 (1999).
9. Fukuyama is preceded by many evolutionists. Among the sources that consider the
relationship between biology and morality are RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF
MORAL SYSTEMS (1987); RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS
(1979); ARNHART, supra note 8; BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS (Jane
Maienschein & Michael Ruse eds., 1999); DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS
(1991); CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); DANIEL C. DENNETI,
DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE (1995); FRANS B.
M. DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND
OTHER ANIMALS (1996); EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki
eds., 1993); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY
(James P. Hurd ed., 1996); ROBERT J. McSHEA, MORALITY AND HUMAN NATURE: A NEW
ROUTE TO ETHICAL THEORY (1990); OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL
PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986); LEWIS PETRINOVICH,
HUMAN EVOLUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 25 (1995); RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); G.E. PUGH, THE BIOLOGICAL
ORIGIN OF HUMAN VALUES (1977); RJ. RICHARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1989); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS
OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996); MICHAEL
RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH To PHILOSOPHY
(1998); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters &
Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993); ROBERT

WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
(1994); C.J. Cela-Conde, The Challenge of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 293
(1986); Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Charles Crawford ed.,
1998); Roger D. Masters, Evolutionary Biology and Natural Right: Leo Strauss, Natural Sci
ence and Political Philosophy, in THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN
PERSPECTIVE 49 (Kenneth Deutsch & Walter Soffer eds., 1987, corrected edition); RJ.
Richards, A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 265 (1986); Michael Ruse
& Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as Applied Science, 61 PHIL. 173 (1986); R. Trigg,
Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 325 (1986); Edward 0. Wilson, The Biological
Basis of Morality, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 53 (April 1998). For concise overviews of the re
surgent interest in the influence of biology on human morality, see Jane Maienschein &
Michael Ruse, Introduction, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 1, and
Phillip R. Sloan, From Natural Law to Evolutionary Ethics in Enlightenment French Natural
History, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra, at 52; WRIGHT, supra, at
327-44.
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GREAT DISRUPTION

In Fukuyama's view, maintaining social order in the face of tech
nological and economic change is one of the greatest challenges facing
information age democracies today (p. 10). Fukuyama's main con
cern, in helping us to face this challenge, is that we bridge disciplines
and understand not only the sources of social disorder but also the
processes by which social order is reconstituted. Those "renorming"
processes include, he argues, not only the traditional and better
known forms of hierarchical, top-down norm creation, from govern
mental, religious, and community authorities, but also spontaneous,
bottom-up renorming, which bubbles up independently of hierarchical
impositions.
Developing this argument requires, and Fukuyama provides, an
extended look at the relationship between hierarchical (formal) and
spontaneous (informal) sources of order. It is here, in arguing for the
probability, existence, and importance of spontaneous renorming, that
Fukuyama draws not only on history and economics, but also on evo
lutionary biology, and biologically informed approaches to psychology
and anthropology.
The book is significant for lawyers for three reasons. First, legal
policymakers are, in part, in the business of combating social disorder;
so a deeper understanding of both its multiple causes and the multiple
ways in which order is reestablished may aid their efforts. Second, the
work complements and extends recent legal scholarship that addresses
the importance, origin, and development of norms (as the result of
self-organization and sometimes surprising decisions of decentralized
individuals10) and also addresses the centrality, to an understanding of

10. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996);
Symposium, Law and the Legal Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1998); Symposium, The Le
gal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1497 (1998); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). A small sampling of the burgeoning literature
includes Lisa Bernstein, SOCIAL NORMS AND DEFAULT RULES ANALYSIS, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory: Thickening the
"Self' in "Self-Interest" in SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES IN CONTEXT (D. J. Galilean ed., 1995);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis
of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Robert C.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 {1998);
Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms
and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994); Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis ofRedistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 {1998); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
Russell Korobkin, Inertia And Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power
ofDefault Rules And Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 {1998); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution,
Politics, and Law (March 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and So
cial Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develop-
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norms, of game-theoretic analyses of how selfish interests can bring
cooperative outcomes.11 Third, the book usefully demonstrates, in a
political science parallel to law, ways in which the tools of behavioral
biology are both accessible to non-biologists, and useful in their aca
demic enterprises. In that demonstration, there are a number of im
portant lessons, taken up in Part IV below.
Fukuyama has three main points, reflected in the three main Parts
of his book. In Part One, entitled "The Great Disruption," Fukuyama
argues that the transition from the industrial age to the information
age has been a mixed blessing. Specifically, when mental labor in
creasingly displaced physical labor, and services began to displace
manufacturing as a source of wealth, this adversely affected our social
relations and moral lives (pp. 3-4). For example, inexpensive informa
tion technology leads both to an increase in individualism and to the
"miniaturization of community" (p. 91). It "erodes the boundaries of
long-established cultural communities" with cheap but relentless tele
vision, radio, fax, and e-mail (p. 3), and it decreases meaningful, long
term, and truly engaged associations between people (pp. 5-6). As
Fukuyama puts it, "The same innovation that increases productivity or
launches a new industry undermines an existing community or makes
an entire way of life obsolete" (p. 282).
This, in turn, increases social disorder. Or relatedly, as Fukuyama
prefers to frame it, this causes a decline in social capital.12 Social capi
tal, the neglected cousin of physical capital (such as machines) and
human capital (such as know-how), is the set of informal values or
norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation

ment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Eco
nomics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law
and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679 (1998); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Loss Aversion
and Involuntary Transfers of Title, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI L. REV. 1175 (1997); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of
Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (1998). On the self-organization of
complexity in Jaw, see generally J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dy
namical Law-and-Society System· A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Com
plexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
.

11. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Ap
proach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI L. REV. 1225 (1997); JACK HIRSHLEIFER,
Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, in
ECONOMIC BERAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 211-73 (1987).
.

12.
19-20.

A

brief history of the coinage and changing applications of the term appears on pp.
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among them.13 Such norms include, for example, reliability, honesty,
and reciprocity.14 The "Great Disruption," of the book's title, is
Fukuyama's term for the dramatic (and in his view largely negative)
changes in social values, between roughly the mid 1960s and the early
1990s, that both reflected and contributed to a sharp, contemporane
ous decline in social capital (p. 4).
Of course, empirically tracing fluctuations in social capital is no
simple task. Fukuyama attempts to estimate changes in the supply of
social capital, across several decades, by advancing a variety of posi
tive and negative measures.15 For the former, he uses data from sur
veys on the subjects of trust, values, and civil society, which correlate
positively with the presence of social capital. For the latter, he princi
pally employs data from national statistical agencies chronicling tradi
tional indicators of social dysfunction. These track and evidence, he
argues, the comparative absence of social capital. Such indicators in
clude increased crime, decline of kinship as a source of social cohe
sion, decline in fertility, decline in the institution of marriage, in
creased illegitimacy, and the decline in trust - both privately (trust
placed in individuals) and publicly (trust afforded institutions).16 The
data suggest that total social capital indeed declined between the
1960s and the 1990s, and that it did so more rapidly than it had during
earlier periods of shifting norms.17
13. P. 16. In other words, as Fukuyama explains, social capital can be variously under
stood to be: the subset of norms that constitutes society's stock of shared values, p. 14; a co
operative norm that has become embedded in the relationships among a group of people,
pp. 27-28; and informal norms promoting cooperative behavior, p. 28. Thus, families, for
example, are an important source of social capital. Pp. 16-17. James Coleman, the sociolo
gist who is most responsible for bringing the term social capital into broader use, defined it
as "the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child." P. 36 (citing JAMES S.
COLEMAN,FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300 (1990)).
14. As Fukuyama illustrates:
If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then
they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any

group or organization more efficient.... Trust is a key by-product of the cooperative social
norms that constitute social capital. If people can be counted on to keep commitments,
honor norms of reciprocity, and avoid opportunistic behavior then groups will form more
readily and those that do form will be able to achieve common purposes more efficiently.

Pp. 16,49.
15. His analysis is anything but parochial. He examines data not only from the United
States, but also from the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Japan, as well as Canada,Australia,
New Zealand, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Norway, Finland, and
Korea. See, e.g., pp. 27-60.
16. Fukuyama reconciles the apparent overall decline in trust and community with data
suggesting an overall increase in group membership by arguing that the "radius of trust" has
shortened, and the number of people within one's community circle has lowered, yielding a
net decline. P. 88.
17. A discussion of methods appears on pp. 20-24. Fukuyama finds that, starting in
roughly 1965, virtually all developed countries experienced a simultaneous and rapid up
swing in negative measures of social capital. P. 27. Crime rates in the United States,for ex-
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Apparently, this matters.
Declining social capital is bad,
Fukuyama argues, not simply because cooperation is normatively nice,
but because the kinds of cooperation social capital fosters are eco
nomically efficient. Specifically, social capital increases aggregate
economic wealth by facilitating gains from trade, as individuals con
tract more with those parties with whom they share norms than they
do with others.18 Social capital is therefore critical to a successful
economy. So critical is social capital, in fact, that Fukuyama describes
it as a prerequisite not only for all forms of group endeavor in a mod
ern society but for civil democratic society itself.19
In Part Two of the book, entitled "On the Genealogy of Morals,"
Fukuyama essentially addresses the question: If social capital is both
crucial and declining, can it be reestablished and preserved, and if so,
by what process? This inquiry requires him to explore, at some length,
the sources of order in human society. A great many who have
thought on the subject of this question apparently tend to believe that
the reconstitution of social order is possible exclusively or primarily
through hierarchical authoritarian interventions from political and re
ligious spheres of influence (p. 6).
In contrast, Fukuyama argues that social order, once disrupted,
tends to be reconstituted, even in the absence of hierarchically im
posed interventions, such as laws, regulations, holy texts, or bureau
cratic organization charts. Capitalist societies are not destined to be
come morally poorer as they become materially wealthier.2° For social
ample, declined slightly in the mid-1980s and then jumped up again in the late 1980s, peak
ing around 1991-92. P. 31. And this same pattern is evident in nearly all other non-Asian
developed countries. P. 31. Because families are an important source of social capital, the
dramatic shifts in social norms concerning reproduction and gender relations, specifically the
pill-induced sexual revolution, the rise of feminism in the 1960s and the 1970s, falling mar
riage rates, and increasing divorce and illegitimacy rates "introduced massive changes not
just in households but in offices, factories, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, education,
even the military. " P. 36; see also pp. 92-111.
18. As Fukuyama puts it:
[S]ocial capital produces wealth and is therefore of economic value to a national !!COn
omy . . . . [It enables individuals to] amplify their own power and abilities by following co
operative rules that constrain their freedom of choice, allow them to communicate with oth
ers, and coordinate their actions. Social virtues like honesty, reciprocity, and keeping
commitments are not choice worthy just as ethical values; they also have a tangible dollar
value and help the groups who practice them achieve shared ends.

P. 14.
19. Pp. 14, 20. Here Fukuyama follows the influential views of Putnam. See Robert D.
Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 65 {1995)
{although the seeds of the idea are in de Tocqueville). Putnam has helped generate a large
literature in both political and legal scholarship, in which questions of civil society, "civic
republicanism, " and communitarianism currently form a major theme. Almost none of this
literature (apart from Fukuyama) pays attention to the evolved psychology of social rela
tions, which any attempts to "reinvigorate" civic participation inevitably must engage and
use.
20. For Fukuyama, it is technological change that disrupts social order, not capitalism
itself. In his view, capitalism, while both a source of disorder and order, is probably a net
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order can and will emerge spontaneously, even in the most technologi
cally sophisticated parts of the global economy, as a bottom-up phe
nomenon - as a function of informal, unpublished, evolving norms in
communities.
This obtains, Fukuyama argues, for two reasons, both revealed in
the light of disciplinary integration. First, our species-typical human
psychology is intrinsically predisposed, by biological heritage, to cre
ate moral rules and cooperative social order.21 This follows from the
predictable effects of evolutionary processes on inclinations that his
torically yielded individual advantage through the mutual gains social
interaction can afford. The adaptive advantage these inclinations pro
vided leave us psychologically uncomfortable when social order is dis
rupted.22 There is therefore a dynamic interplay between the erosion
of norms and the process of renorming, as reconstitution springs from
our innate human nature to seek cooperation and moral rules that
bind us together in ways often facilitating mutual gain. Second, we are
also by nature rational, and rational calculation will make us realize
the value of cooperation, prompting us to be, in fact, more coopera
tive. In three chapters at the heart of the book - Eight, Nine, and
Ten - Fukuyama roots each of these two reasons (one less cognitive,
the other more so) in modern evolutionary biology, having described
the study of how order arises from self-organization as "one of the
most interesting and important intellectual developments of our time"
{p. 6).
To be sure, Fukuyama does not claim that spontaneous order can
solve all collective action problems. And his discussions of the limits
of spontaneous order, when hierarchical interventions are necessary to
increase and maintain social capital, are among the most intellectually
honest (if necessarily untidy) parts of the book (Chapter 13). But the
fact that hierarchically imposed norms are often necessary does not
undermine Fukuyama's principal point: spontaneous sources of norms
are far more important to our understanding of human norms, and to
the maintenance of a thriving economy, than previously accepted.23
generator of norms. The very thing that makes capitalism thrive - self-interest - leads to
cooperation. See, e.g., pp. 253, 261-62.
21. "Human beings by nature are social creatures with certain built-in, natural capabili
ties for solving problems of social cooperation and inventing more rules to constrain individ
ual choice." P. 231; see also p. 137.
22. This argument is summarized most succinctly on p. 6. See also p. 137 {"The situation
of normlessness - what Durkheim labeled anomie - is intensely uncomfortable for us, and
we will seek to create new rules to replace the ones that have been undercut. If technology
makes certain old forms of community difficult to sustain, then we will seek out new ones,
and we will use our reason to negotiate different arrangements that will suit our underlying
interests, needs, and passions.").
23. For a discussion on how the presence of spontaneous renorming processes can pro
vide an emotional basis for the development and maintenance of hierarchical institutions
specialized in norm-making, see infra Section III.D.
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These spontaneous sources of norms, Fukuyama claims, could theo
retically help to counteract the Great Disruption of social norms (and
thus social capital) occasioned by the transition from the industrial age
to the information age.
In Part Three of the book, entitled "The Great Reconstruction,"
Fukuyama assesses the extent to which that theoretical possibility is
probable. He argues that understanding how evolutionary processes
have affected human behavior affords us some comfort in predicting
that humankind will adapt to disruption with reconstitution, and that a
healthy and stable social order will once again emerge.
Thus, the good news is that the social disruption is not here to stay,
as the inevitable end of the Enlightenment, secular humanism, capi
talism, and the like. Social and moral disorder is reversible through
renorming processes. The bad news is that the reversal is not strictly
inevitable (p. 282). For while "decentralized groups of people will
tend to produce order if left to their own devices" (p. 253), this is a
tendency, not an inevitability.
Fukuyama argues that successful and beneficial renorming proc
esses involve not only the spontaneous renorming of a species predis
posed to renorm, but also, ideally, two parallel effects. These include
the effects of hierarchical impositions (such as state police powers and
religious admonishments) as well as the efforts of rational individuals
who, having recognized that their communal lives have deteriorated,
"work actively to renorm their society through discussion, argument,
cultural argument, and even culture wars" (p. 250). That is, at the
same time that Fukuyama argues that spontaneous sources of order
are probable, he also argues that we cannot passively rely on sponta
neous renorming alone. There are still (many readers will be relieved
to learn) important roles for careful public planning and hierarchical
renorming. Specifically: "Rational hierarchical authority, in the form
of government and formal law, will have to serve as supplements ....
State authority in the form of formal law will always be a necessary
complement and corrective . . . to the extended order of human coop
eration."24
Fortunately, argues Fukuyama, the early stages of reconstitution
are already visible today. Fukuyama notes, for example, that rates of
24. P. 221. Discussing the probable persistence of hierarchical sources of order even in
informal networks, Fukuyama states:
We can argue that networks will become more important in the technological world of the
future and yet concede that there are at least three reasons why hierarchy will remain a nec
essary part of organization for the foreseeable future. First, we cannot take the existence of
networks and their underlying social capital for granted, and where they don't exist, hierar
chy may be the only possible form of organization. Second, hierarchy is often functionally
necessary for organizations to achieve their goals. And third, people by nature like to or
ganize themselves hierarchically.
P.222.

Michigan Law Review

2084

[Vol. 98:2072

increase in crime, divorce, illegitimacy, and distrust have reversed or
slowed substantially, particularly in the United States, but also in
many of the other countries he identifies as having experienced sharp
increases in social disorder in the 1960s (p. 271). He sees these data as
evidence that "the Great Disruption has run its course and that the
process of renorming has already begun" (p. 271). And, because in
ternalized rules and norms of behavior are preconditions of successful
reconstitution, Fukuyama predicts that "the world of the twenty-first
century will depend heavily on such informal norms" (p. 7). We will
see this in human organizations that show less reliance on formal hier
archies and more reliance on the shared values inherent in informal
networks.
III.

LESSONS AND CHALLENGES

The Great Disruption is forcefully written, original, and engaging.
The tackled topic - predicting the social contours of the full informa
tion age society-is important. By raising and confronting the ques
tions of how we can maintain and increase social capital in an in
creasingly fractured social world, Fukuyama identifies problems, the
implications of which we may not have fully recognized, and tenders a
framework for thinking about and confronting them. His book pro
vides us not only with an interesting theory to explain recent disrup
tions in social order, but also with a better sense of the processes by
which social capital - a key component of social order - is created
and maintained.
One of the questions that I think the book does not squarely con
front, however, concerns the issue of net effects. That is, we now
know that technological change, for all the benefits it offers, can
prompt declines in valuable social capital, thereby imposing costs.
Fukuyama clearly considers these costs, were they to remain unreme
died, unacceptable.25 But remedies - replenishing social capital also cost, presumably. Is there no point at which the magnitude of the
gains from technology simply outweighs the costs, even if some quan
tum of lost social capital were never replenished?
While I am confident that Fukuyama has important things to say
about this question, it still remains a question. But it is not the kind of
question on which I wish to focus here. In my view, the real signifi
cance of the book is more in its method than its substance. Behavioral
biology is the linchpin of Fukuyama's analysis, and of increasing im
portance in the legal arena, and it is therefore on Fukuyama's use of
biology that I wish to concentrate.
25. After all, to label something a "Disruption" is, I think, to offer a value judgment
rather than a mere description, identifying a normatively bad interference with what had
previously been better.
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Fukuyama has a clear vision of the importance of integrating life
and social science perspectives into public policy analysis. But he does
more, in this book, than simply turn to the evolutionary sciences (such
as ethology, primatology, behavioral biology, evolutionary psychology,
and evolutionary anthropology) for insights into human morality and
future social ordering. He goes beyond integration and boldly at
tempts application, in the context of some very pressing issues. And
this works better in some instances than in others.26
Fukuyama's invocations of biology reflect a current and sophisti
cated familiarity (to which the notes to Chapters 9 and 10, in particu
lar, attest). He gives a broad and readable account of basic principles
in modern evolutionary biology, drawing knowledgeably, for example,
on the works of leading primatologists, such as Frans de Waal and
Richard Wrangham. He neatly integrates accounts of the supplanta
tion, by William Hamilton's and George Williams's theories, of earlier
theories of group selection and the origins of altruistic behavior (p.
161). He provides explanations for the counterintuitive propositions
that the self-serving orientation of genes will often lead to genuinely
cooperative, sometimes even "altruistic," forms of behavior. And, to
make the argument from biology comprehensible, he provides a com
petent and engaging survey of topics ranging from natural selection,
sexual selection, and kin selection, on one hand, to cooperation and
reciprocal altruism, on the other.
This is not easy to do, particularly in a comparatively short space,
but Fukuyama does it rather well.27 It is one of his great strengths that

26. It bears emphasis that Fukuyama's approach is a sharp break from prevailing as
sumptions that philosophy and psychology can, either alone or in concert, provide adequate
explanation for human morality and norms. It is also a sharp break from the recent trend to
use game theoretic models of competing norms, analyzed solely at the cultural level of
transmission, to explain dominant ones. It is an argument for both the utility and centrality
of evolutionary theory in understanding complex human phenomena.
27. Pp. 154-86. For introductions to these subjects written explicitly for lawyers, see
Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief
Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 131 (1999) (addressing core
principles of behavioral biology); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Intro
duction and Application to Child Abuse, 15 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1126-57 (1997) (Part I offers
"A Primer in Law-Relevant Evolutionary Biology"); Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology:
Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 167 (1997) (dis
cussing integration of life science and social science perspectives); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Cul
ture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 81 CAL. L. REV. 827,
841-53 (1999) (addressing core principles of behavioral biology).
Book-length popular accounts of behavioral biology include MATI RIDLEY, THE RED
QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUITON OF HUMAN NATURE (1994) and ROBERT WRIGHT,
THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUITONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 55-107
{1994). Accessible textbooks include JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLU
TIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID Buss, EVOLUITONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN,
BIOLOGY, EVOLUITON, AND HUMAN NATURE (forthcoming 2000); ROBERT TR!VERS,
SOCIALEVOLUITON {1985).
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he sees the large-scale connectedness between historically separated
aspects of the human condition. For example, he understands and
manages to convey why there are biological bases to social emotions
generally, and to moral sentiments and rule-following specifically.28
Moreover, he weaves into his discussion information concerning the
biological bases for status seeking, anger, guilt, pride, shame, jealousy,
love of children, and the like.29 He sees the deep commonalities be
tween biological and economic reasoning, without naively supposing
that these are without significant points of departure.30 He sees the in
fluence of biology on family relationships.31 And, most significantly,
he has a manifest awareness of the centrality of evolutionary theory in
putting all of this in a coherent perspective.
There are a number of different lessons in this approach. The first
lesson is that one cannot think accurately and comprehensively about
important issues of human behavior without some sense of the histori
cal, evolutionary contexts in which that behavior plays out. Period.
To attempt otherwise is as silly as trying to explain modern geopoliti
cal boundaries without any attention to history. The past shapes the
present and constrains the future. To the extent that law is fundamen
tally about shifting human behavior in directions it might not other
wise go, the more historically accurate and contextualized framework
that biology affords may help us to pursue our legal policies more effi
ciently.
Second, the general moral sentiments, including shame, guilt, sen
sitivity to injustice, a taste for reciprocity, and moralistic aggression,
are rooted (like other emotions, such as sexual attraction and jealousy,
love of offspring, distaste for incest and rape, and anger) in
information-processing pathways that natural selection has influ
enced.32 To the extent that morality and emotions are relevant to law,
28. See, e.g., pp. 149, 175-79, 184-85. For more on these topics, see Owen D. Jones, Law,
Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICSJ. 283 (1999).
29. See, e.g., p. 184.
30. See pp. 161-62 (describing both "methodological borrowing" and differences be
tween the fields). Richard Posner has explored a number of intportant connections between
biological and economic reasoning. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992),
where he observes that "there are illuminating analytical parallels between the biological
and economic approaches . . . tne two approaches are mutually reinforcing and may in com
bination constitute a more powerful theory than either by itself. " Id. at 88. The economist
Jack Hirshleife r was aµiong the first to observe the potential for integrating biological and
economic insights. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Viewpoint, 20
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1977). And Paul Rubin, among others, continues in this important tradi
tion. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evollltion of Political Preferences, 3
AM. L. &ECON. REV. {forthcoming 2001).
31. See, e.g., pp. 95-101 (describing biological underpinnings of family).
32. Darwin essentially argued this in The Descent ofMan. See DARWIN, supra note 9,
chs. 3, 5. It is interesting to note thatJohn Rawls, in Theory ofJustice, also speculated that
there may be evolutionary origins to his basic claints about moral principles. JOHN RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE 502-03 (1971).
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the further study of biobehavioral influences on their pan-human,
nonrandom patterns will provide a richer understanding of the recip
rocal relationship between morality, culture, and law.
Third, integrating biology into discussions of politics, law, and
other complex human behaviors is, while highly useful, at times ex
tremely challenging. The following Sections describe four of these
challenges.

A. The Non-Normativeness ofNorms
One of the most challenging aspects of discussing the relevance of
behavioral biology to human behavior, and particularly to morality
and norms, is to leave norms out of it. By that, I mean that one must
simultaneously acknowledge the evolutionary influences on the form
and content of norms, and avoid concluding that the norms themselves
are normatively good or bad, on the basis of biology alone.
Put another way: explanation is not justification, and description is
not prescription. The realms of the descriptive "is" and the normative
"ought" are logically separate. To combine them is to commit what is
known as the Naturalistic Fallacy - arguing that what is is what ought
to be.33 (Committing this error gave Social Darwinists - forever - an
aptly deserved bad name, as they misappropriated Darwinian ideas,
and argued that the upper classes were upper by merit, and deserved
to remain there, by biology.) The results of biological processes can
not be described as good or bad without identifying and injecting a
value outside biology that makes us think them so. For example, we
now have a great deal of information concerning biobehavioral influ
ences on sexual aggression and on child abuse.34 But that need never
lead us to conclude that sexual aggression or child abuse are permissi
ble.35

33. The term was coined in G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62, 89-110 (Thomas
Baldwin ed., 2d ed. 1993), but the concept traces to the 1888 edition of DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978).
The reciprocal and less recognized error is the one more commonly committed. One com
mits the Moralistic Fallacy whenever one attempts to reason (usually implicitly rather than
explicitly): that the way something ought to be is the way that it is; that explanation follows
inclination; and that facts follow preferences. For discussion of the Moralistic Fallacy, see
Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the Study of Human Behaviour: An Intro
duction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES
AND APPLICATIONS 9 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds.,1998); Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology of Rape, supra note 27, at 893-95; Charles Crawford, Book Review, 20
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 139 (1999) (reviewing Uniting Psychology and Biology:
Integrative Perspectives on Human Development).
34. See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27; Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology ofRape, supra note 27.
35. We could, therefore, maintain that the descriptive and normative realms are to be
held completely separate. Of course,the matter is considerably more complicated than that.
When we have a normative goal to change behavior,that goal is furthered by greater knowl
edge of the pathways by which the behavior arises. So much is clear. Less clear is the point,
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Fukuyama meets this challenge of disentangling is from ought and
demonstrates it is possible to invoke biology without claiming that
what is biological is necessarily good. While he happens to believe
that our evolved predispositions toward cooperation are good, it is be
cause he values (not surprisingly) the effects of such cooperation on
the economy and political order. Thus, it is because he values effi
ciency, increases in wealth, and political, civil, and democratic stability
that he finds the particular biological predispositions to which he re
fers to be fortunate. This is not at all the same thing as claiming (as
some critics incorrectly presume that those who invoke biology auto
matically claim) that all biological predispositions are fortunate, sim
ply because they have evolved.
B.

Adapting to Adaptation

A second challenge to future discussions of the biology of human
psychological predispositions concerns the nature of adaptation. It
turns out that it is not a simple matter to differentiate adaptations
from by-products of adaptations.36 This is hard enough when biolo
gists examine anatomy, but it is particularly difficult when animal psy
chology is involved. Information-processing patterns are not easily
observable, they interact with one another, and they often include, in
any event, nested algorithms sensitive to variations in environmental
stimuli. But it is even more difficult to predict how given human psy
chological adaptations will play out in the future.
Fukuyama predicts, for example, that humans will successfully re
norm, in a way that preserves social capital, because evolutionary pro
cesses have rendered normlessness uncomfortable for us, and have left
us psychologically predisposed to cooperate and solve collective action
problems. While I share the author's hope for a successful and renor
med human future, I am not yet persuaded that biology affords us
quite the degree of confidence that Fukuyama thinks it does. For ex
ample, in Fukuyama's view:
[K] nowing that there are important natural and spontaneous sources of
social order is not a minor insight. It suggests that culture and moral val
ues will continue to evolve in ways that will allow people to adapt to the

which some have argued, that while the "is" does not strictly dictate the "ought," it may be
inefficient and silly to generate an ought without some working knowledge of even poten
tially surmountable constraints on the "is." For example, Lewis Petrinovich argues that
"The nature of what is should be understood as a factor to enable us to frame the ought in
better terms." PETRINOVICH, supra note 9, at 25. This line of reasoning (how can you have
anything but wildly irrational values if you are ignorant of facts) is also explored in
DENNETI, supra note 9, at 467-68.

36. An adaptation is a heritable feature of an organism enabling it to survive, and to
increase the copies of its genes that appear in the next generation, in its natural environ
ment, better than if it lacked the feature.
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changing technological and economic conditions they face and that this
spontaneous evolution will interact with hierarchical authority to pro
duce an 'extended order of human cooperation'. . . . [W]e should pre
sume that people will continue to use their innate capabilities and reason
to evolve rules that serve their long-term interests and needs. [p. 244]
I am certain that Fukuyama is not arguing that reason alone, or
evolved behavioral predispositions alone, are sufficient to guarantee
or nearly guarantee a successful future. But I am equally certain that
Fukuyama is arguing that our evolved behavioral predispositions very
significantly increase the probability that such a future will obtain. I'm
not sure this is right. I find it more difficult than Fukuyama does to
conclude that knowledge of evolutionary processes affords us comfort
in believing that humankind is very likely to meet the challenges of
technological change.37
I have four reasons for reservation. First, 99.9% of all species that
ever lived are extinct.38 Presumably, many of them were well-adapted
to their environments before some external change changed every
thing. The odds are against the long-term persistence of any species,
let alone one as young and volatile as our own, encountering novel
changes of our own creation, that we generate faster than generations.
Second, evolutionary processes adapt species to previously pre
vailing, not future, environments. True, we are a species for whom
behavio.ral adaptability (or "plasticity") is itself an evolved adaptation.
We are more adaptable than many other species, and our adaptability
flows principally from the powerful cognitive capacities that enable us
to crunch more data, in more sophisticated and nuanced fashion, than
other creatures. So, to the extent that thinking hard about the present
and future can help us turn the present into a viable future, our cogni
tive abilities may help us secure some endlessly renormed future. But
this much we already knew. The optimism Fukuyama offers comes
from the hope that our current brains are already up to future chal
lenges, not from the confidence that natural selection will somehow
shape our brains to successfully meet future challenges.
The distinction is important. We know that natural selection can
not design future-looking adaptations. The process is, after all, a
mindless one - without foresight by definition. Natural selection ap
pears never to have designed, nor do biologists expect it ever can de
sign, an all-purpose adaptability mechanism designed to ensure adap
tation to current or future social or technological change, when then
prevailing conditions differ from ancestral ones, in which current ad-

37. To be sure, Fukuyama is not naive enough to think that anything "guarantees that
there will be upturns in the cycle [of social order]." P. 282 (emphasis added). A quite dis
tinct optimism, however, just shy of confidence, pervades the book.
38. See DAVID RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 3-4 (1991) (reporting
the estimate).
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aptations were designed. To the extent that features of our species or
others function well in current environments, it is either because the
environments have not changed materially from the environments in
which those features evolved, or because those features, which were
adaptive in ancestral environments for one reason, tum out also to be
adaptive in a different, current environment for another.
Third, the animal kingdom provides daily examples of adaptations
that run aground on environmental changes. Moths do circle lamp
lights, because the moon and stars used to provide reliable reference
points for navigation. Squirrels vocally harass hunters, whose guns af
ford novel ways of killing them. People overconsume highly caloric
foods, which contairi energy concentrations never before encountered
in nature. And humans continue to be sexually attracted to (and
sexually jealous of) people they know are (and perhaps want to be)
using contraception. An adaptation is only as good as the environ
ment in which it continues to provide advantage - and historical ad
aptations can, during environmental shifts, prove downright deleteri
ous.39 Some of the evolved predispositions we manifest, therefore,
such as aggressive responses to threats to status, may decrease the
probability of a secure future precisely because they encounter novel
technological features, from street-common handguns to interconti
nental ballistic missiles.
Fourth, if our human psychology turns out not to be well-adapted
to the technological environment we are creating for ourselves, we
know that natural selection is unlikely to yield responsive adaptations
anytime soon. Soon, by evolutionary standards, is measured in gen
erations, which for humans are rather long, compared with the rapid
ity of technological changes. For the distribution within a population
to manifest a "new" trait soon, a heritable trait must have arisen
(through mutation or genetic recombination), and it must provide in the then existing environment - a very pronounced reproductive
advantage over alternative traits contemporaneously existing.40 Such
circumstances are generally rare, but even more so for a species like
ours with small brood size.

39. This can lead to something I refer to as "time shifted rationality" (to distinguish it
from "bounded rationality") - the temporal mismatch of historically adaptive behavior and
modern environments. See Owen D. Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution,
Paper presented at The Olin Conference: Evolution and Legal Theory, Georgetown
University Law Center (April 16, 1999), and the Annual Scholarship Conference of the
Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
40. For an example of the strength of selection pressures necessary to cause speedy
changes in morphology, see Jonathan B. Losos et al., Contingency and Determinism in Repli
cated Adaptive Radiations ofIsland Lizards, 279 SCIENCE 2115 (1998); Gretchen Vogel, For

Island Lizards, History Repeats Itself, 279 SCIENCE 2043 (1998).
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Our Dispositions Toward Predispositions

A third challenge concerns the subtle interactions of genes and en
vironment. Fukuyama is far too sophisticated to put stock in the ri
diculous notion that there can ever be a meaningful discussion of
whether a given behavior is exclusively the province of nature or of
nurture.41 This is like debating whether the area of a rectangle is the
product of its length or its width. All biological processes, including
normal brain development, ultimately depend on rich environmental
inputs. Similarly, all environmental influences can only be perceived,
sorted, analyzed, and understood through biological, evolved proc
esses.
At the same time, Fukuyama recognizes that the influence of bio
behavioral predispositions is more direct, and can be spoken of more
meaningfully, in the contexts of some behaviors than others. (Com
pare extremes: sexual behavior, for example, on one hand, with filing
an SEC disclosure statement, on the other.) This has led to a ten
dency, presumably in the interests of verbal economy, for Fukuyama
to refer to some behaviors as being under "genetic rather than cultural
control,"42 or as being "determined not by culture but by biology."43

I think this tendency is, though understandable, unfortunate for
two reasons. First, the use of the words "control" and "determined"
- rather than variations of the word "influence," for example - may
inadvertently reinforce the rnisperception that behavioral biology is
about genetic determinism. A reader who has not attempted to keep
pace with the explosion of modern biology literature, as Fukuyama
has, might fairly recoil from the impression that some significant num
ber of complex, non-reflex human behaviors are simply unavoidable.
Second, by using language of mutual exclusivity (controlled by x
"rather than" y; determined "not by [x] but by [y]") Fukuyama over
dichotomizes in a way few biologists would sanction.44 Again, this may
confuse readers.

41. See, e.g., p. 158 (discussing the interplay of nature and nurture).
42. The author describes how a variety of mother-infant interactions "appear to be un
der genetic rather than cultural control" P. 96. See also pp. 158-59, 165.
43. P. 158 ("so too may human cultures reflect common social requirements detennined
not by culture but by biology").
44. For another example, see p. 187 (" [T]he particular norms and metanorms chosen by
a given group of individuals are cultural choice, not a product of nature."). I think the dis
tinction Fukuyama wants to draw here is not between culture and biology (or nature), but
rather between cultural vectors of trait transmission and genetic vectors of trait transmission,
both of which are biological Culture is best considered as a fully integrated part of our biol
ogy - both in the sense that culture reflects natural selection's influence on the human
brain, and also in the sense that cultural practices reciprocally affect human breeding pat
terns, and thus contribute to selection pressures that ultimately affect the spread of heritable
human psychological predispositions.
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Fukuyama somewhat underemphasizes, I believe, three things he
knows, but that writers on human behavioral biology could probably
and usefully make greater efforts to underscore. First, a predisposi
tion is not a predetermination. One of the advantages of our large
brain is that it can accommodate a very wide and highly nuanced
range of inclinations - which by measures both large and tiny can in
crease or decrease the probabilities of various behaviors, in the face of
various circumstances. Second, biobehavioral predispositions are gen
erally condition-dependent (that is, context-specific), not automatic.45
Third, and this point underscores the second, we are talking, in all of
this, about the evolved psychology aspect of behavioral biology, not
the behavioral genetics aspect.
The distinction is important, and rarely explicit. Behavioral ge
netics involves efforts to trace the different behaviors of different in
dividuals to genetic differences among them. (This is what most peo
ple, incorrectly, think discussions of human behavioral biology are
about.) In contrast, the complementary aspect of behavioral biology,
concerning evolved or "species-typical" psychology, attempts to trace
many of the different behaviors of different individuals not to differ
ent versions of genes, but rather to different environmental stimuli en
countered by neurologically similar brains, sporting similar, evolved,
and contingent decisional algorithms. That is, humans bear species
wide (in some cases sex-wide) physical, information-processing com
monalities that have evolved to yield predispositions toward certain
behaviors in the face of certain categories and confluences of stimuli,
and predispositions toward other behaviors in other contexts.
D.

Reasons for Rationality

A fourth challenge, and perhaps the one most crucial for the law at
present, concerns the relationship between rationality, its supposed
opposites, and biology. There are times, in The Great Disruption,
when Fukuyama describes both sociality and rationality as products of
human nature.46 That is, he does acknowledge, in places, that ration-

45. This means that co=on psychological predispositions can sometimes underlie even
cultural differences among groups, which may be the result of those predispositions proc
essing materially different environmental circumstances. Contrast:
One of the weaknesses of any attempt to use human nature to explain phenomena like trust
and social capital is that it cannot give an account of the observable differences that exist be
tween human groups. And so too here. The kinds of universal psychological characteristics
described earlier as the basis for social capital are sufficient to explain why there should be
social cooperation within relatively small groups, but they do not explain why different con
temporary human societies have different radii of trust. These kinds of explanations must be
entirely cultural in nature, and often need to refer back to a society's religious heritage.

P. 240.
46. For example:
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ality is itself a function of our biology. He is not consistent in this,
however. Fukuyama's approach generally demonstrates an apparent
preference for sorting behaviors on a continuum bounded by the bio
logically influenced, at one end, and the rationally influenced, at the
other.47 In these contexts, the rational pathway to behavior is some
how distinct from the biological pathway to behavior. It is clear why
Fukuyama wants to draw this distinction. He is attempting to con
struct a useful taxonomy that attends to differences in the extent to
which given behaviors are rationally chosen. But I do think the dis
tinction, as framed, is a bit misleading.
Of course, there are at least two different meanings to rational.
One describes a process of cognitive decisionmaking. The other de
scribes the substantive end product behavior, judged by a standard ir
respective of the process by which that behavior was generated.
(Much ink has been spilled by authors using mismatched meanings,
such that rational processes can lead to irrational outcomes, and irra
tional processes can lead to rational outcomes.) But, whichever one of
these two common meanings Fukuyama intends (I think it is the
process-based former), it seems likely that Fukuyama over-separates
the rational from the biological.
The biological/rational distinction only makes sense if the rational
is not itself importantly biological. But of course it is. Rationality, as
a process, is not just trivially biological, in the sense that thinking and
decisionmaking happen to take place in living tissue with chemical
needs and electrical outputs. Rationality is importantly biological in
the sense that the structure of the brain is believed to contain features
evolved to facilitate precisely the kind of multiple-variable, context
specific, calculus that increases the probability of the most adaptive
[H]uman beings are by nature social creatures, whose most basic drives and instincts lead
them to create moral rules that bind themselves together into communities. They are also by
nature rational, and their rationality allows them to create ways of cooperating with one an
other spontaneously.
P. 6.
47. For example:
What we find is that order and social capital have two broad bases of support. The first is
biological, and emerges from human nature itself. There have been important recent ad
vances in the life sciences, which have the cumulative effect of reestablishing the classical
view that human nature exists and that their nature makes humans social and political crea
tures with great capabilities for establishing social rules. While this research in a certain
sense does not tell us anything that Aristotle didn't know, it allows us to be much more pre
cise about the nature of human sociability and what is and is not rooted in the human ge
nome. The second basis of support for social order is human reason, and reason's ability to
spontaneously generate solutions to problems of social cooperation.
P. 138. See also pp. 152-53, figs. 8.3 & 8.4; p. 249 ("[H]uman beings will produce moral rules
for themselves, partly because they are designed by nature to do so and partly as a result of
their pursuit of self-interest."); p. 273 {"People are social animals by nature and, in addition,
rational creators of cultural rules. Both nature and rationality ultimately support the devel
opment of the ordinary virtues like honesty, reliability, and reciprocity that constitute the
basis for social capital.").
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behavioral response.48 The brain's ability and tendency to calculate is
an evolved capability, in the same way that the breast's ability to yield
milk after birth is an evolved capability. Neither is more "biological"
than the other in this broad but basic sense. Both are species-typical
aspects of ways in which genes pass themselves from one generation to
the next.
Similarly, for rationality as outcome, the brain of our species tends
to yield rational conclusions (in many, but not all, circumstances) be
cause ancestral individuals whose heritable brain design tended to
yield irrational conclusions tended to behave in irrational ways. By
definition, such behavior leads to individual disadvantage, and hence
(typically) to reproductive disadvantage. That, over time, leads to
proportionally fewer brains with a predisposition toward irrational
preferences (which, we must remember, vastly outnumber rational
preferences at every moment in time).
This leads me to conclude two things. First, that Fukuyama might
have done better to label the antipode of rational causation emotional
(rather than "biological") causation. Second, that Fukuyama might
fruitfully have framed both the rational and the emotional within the
biological. This second conclusion would afford biology a broader and
more scientifically accurate role, and it would avoid over-cabining
biological influences in the quadrant of Fukuyama's analysis in which
only arational, spontaneous sources of order emerge. It would also
highlight the deep connectedness between emotional and rational be
havior, which in the end strengthens, in my view, many of Fukuyama's
most interesting points.
In Chapter 8, Fukuyama offers an original, two-axis, four-quadrant
framework for plotting sources of order (p. 152, fig. 8.3).

48. See generally THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
(Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby eds., 1992). The alternative in
cludes context-insensitive decisional rules that are adaptive only on average. For example, a
lemming swims across water. Most Jemmings encountering water encounter streams, ponds,
rivers, or lakes - which are swimmable and may afford new foraging opportunities on the
other side. Sometimes the water is an ocean. But the behavioral predisposition is context
insensitive, leading to the unfortunate demise of many - but importantly not all - Jem
mings. For those who survive the statistically more frequent swims across shorter bodies of
water, a swimming predisposition is still more adaptive, on average, than never swimming,
and therefore such a species-typical predisposition can persist.
GENERATION OF CULTURE
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S OURCES OF ORDER
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Historical tradition
Incest taboos

Spontaneously
generated
Folk religion
Biologically
grounded norms

Arational

One axis spans from rational to arational sources of order. The bi
secting axis spans from hierarchically generated sources of order to
spontaneously generated sources of order. There are a variety of self
evident advantages to this framework. One of the disadvantages is
that it sometimes obscures quite important relationships between dif
ferent quadrants. For example, it can be interpreted to suggest that
rational, hierarchically generated sources of order, including written
constitutions, "formal law," and other consciously-constructed, top
down impositions of order are not significantly biologically influenced.
Fukuyama locates incest taboos within the arational, spontaneously
generated, "biologically grounded" norms. At the same time, it is
clear that the opposite quadrant contains formal laws written to pro
scribe incest. Are these not also biologically influenced, as a function
of the well-documented maladaptiveness of breeding between close
relatives, and the adaptive moral repugnance that typically prevents
it?49 The content of a norm in the hierarchical rational quadrant can
be strongly influenced by the content of a biobehavioral predisposition
evolved as a function of natural selection.50

49. For discussion of the evolution of incest aversion, see ROBIN Fox, THE RED LAMP
OF INCEST (rev. ed. 1983); Debra Lieberman & Donald Symons, Sibling Incest Avoidance:
From Westermarck to Wolf, 73 Q. REV. OFBIO. 463 (1999).
50. The Uniform Commercial Code, which presumably occupies a position in the
"hierarchical/rational" quadrant of Fukuyama's framework, states that "[e]very contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). The force of the requirement is underscored by the fact that, in con
trast to most other provisions of the Code, it cannot be waived by either party or otherwise
contracted around. Although it requires some speculation, it seems probable that such a
provision reflects one end result of natural selection's operation on predispositions con-
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Fukuyama is clearly too sophisticated to believe that the quadrants
are not intimately connected. Yet an emphasis on the inevitability
of their interrelationship is neither highlighted nor explored.
Fukuyama's structure causes readers to stop just short of making one
of the most important points about formal law: many of its patterns
reflect biologically influenced behavioral, moral, and emotional pre
dispositions.
Similarly, the two other quadrants of Fukuyama's
framework, involving arational hierarchically generated sources of or
der, such as religions, and rational spontaneously generated sources of
order, such as the common law, are imbued with biological influences
on human morality and thus on behavioral predispositions. {Anyone
who believes that religious proscriptions of sexual behavior or the
common law's accommodation of crimes of passion do not reflect
natural selection's operation on human emotions and tastes needs to
think a bit longer.)
Framing rationality and emotionality as close cousins, as I sug
gested above, rather than as wholly different sources of behavior, re
quires taking two giant steps back. From this vantage, one can see the
rational and emotional capabilities of the brain as merely varied mani
festations of a single aspect of brain function. This aspect has evolved
to solve one problem in a variety of different ways. The problem is:
how to increase the proportion of copies of one's genes that appear in
That overarching problem is subdivisible,
the next generation.
loosely, into a variety of different kinds of challenges. Some chal
lenges require nutritional provisioning. Others require identifying and
attracting a suitable sexual partner. Some require the ability to iden
tify and avoid life-threatening injuries. Others require the sort of in
group maneuvering for advantage that we label political.
The remarkable thing about the human brain is that it has evolved
to solve these different challenges by associating some kinds of envi
ronmental stimuli with some kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g.,
the more visceral emotional pathways), and other kinds of stimuli with
other kinds of motivational mechanisms (e.g., the more consciously
analytical pathways). For example, there are some circumstances
posing sufficiently grave threats, with historically effective options so
limited, that conscious analysis can be dispensed with entirely. Under
these circumstances, an appropriate physiological response can be di
rected, immediately following perception, by parts of the brain spe-

cerning cooperative interactions, which operation tended to yield sharp moralistic reactions
to "bad faith" (i.e., cheating) acts by defectors from cooperative undertakings. The evolved
emotion toward cheaters likely led to a social norm, which led in tum to customary trade
practices (lex mercatoria), some of which were imported to the common law, and later
codified. Thus, the existence and content of the norm in the hierarchical/rational quadrant
may derive from sources of social order in the spontaneous/arational quadrant, via the
spontaneous/rational quadrant.
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cializing in non-deliberative decisionmaking. That is, the behavior of
the body is removed from rational control.
For instance, in moments of grave physical danger, the brain does
not route the question of appropriate response to the rational calcula
tor. Instead, it automatically increases heart rate and respiration. It
ensures that adrenaline is secreted by adrenal glands, which natural
selection has favored for performing precisely this function. And it
temporarily redirects energy away from digestive, reproductive, and
other postponable operations, making more energy available for
physical maneuvering, such as flight. In addition, it yanks the con
scious brain into directing its full and focused attention on a threat
perceived elsewhere in the brain and not yet routed through the ra
tional calculator. What we call fear is the aggregated physiological re
sponses the brain directs as a result of evolutionary processes making
this way of generating behavior more likely to result in adaptive re
sponse to environmental challenges than many other ways of gener
ating behavior.
A more pointed (if somewhat graphic) example: men do not say

Hmmm. I observe that my wife is having intercourse with another man.
This is a breach of contract. It may yield an offspring, not mine, that by
law I must care for and pay for as if it were. That is likely to be more
costly, over time, than would be my effort to stop it. Hence, I should in
tervene. "Excuse me. . . .
"

The raw absurdity of processing this sort of information through a ra
tional calculator is not lost on natural selection, which routes the in
formation in an entirely different way. That is, it is not purely because
we have learned to be jealous that we are jealous. What we call jeal
ousy is a state of the nervous system that we can identify only because
it increases the probability of behaviors that we take to be consistent
with sexual or emotional proprietariness.51 Tue adaptive value of
those behaviors, in ancestral environments, served to preserve the
propensity to respond to infidelity with the information-processing
predisposition that increases the probability of those behaviors.
The main point, though, is that emotional and rational approaches,
as well as every combination of emotional and rational approaches in
between, are all meaningfully biological. Tuey reflect the effects of
natural selection on the brain's ability to generate the appropriate be
haviors for the appropriate circumstances.52 Natural selection gives to
the rational calculator what tends to belong there. That does not,

51. On the evolution of jealousy, see DAVID M. Buss, THE DANGEROUS PASSION:
WHY JEALOUSY IS AS NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX (2000) and DAVID M. Buss, THE
EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING (1994).
52. For an interesting discussion of how emotions also function, adaptively, as credible
pre-commitment devices, see ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRA
TEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988).
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however, render the workings or product of the rational calculator any
less meaningfully biological than emotions. And seeing the deep con
nectedness between the two may help us to avoid the same sort of
over-division that our balkanized disciplines reflect.

IV. LEGAL !MPLICATIONS
What are the key legal implications of this line of reasoning? At
the most general level, a biologically-informed approach to law - an
evolutionary analysis in law - can help to refine behavioral models;
generate new legal strategies, improve cost-benefit analyses, and point
directions for future research.s3 In the specific contexts of morals and
norms, there are several specific implications.
A principal utility of evolutionary analysis in law can be summed
up in two words: universal acid.s4 Evolutionary analysis helps to dis
solve intellectual untenability. No theory of mind, no theory of be
havior, no theory of culture, and no theory of rational or irrational be

havior can long stand if it is inconsistent with the way natural selection
has shaped the information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of
brain function. It is certainly true, of course, that not everything in
modem ethics can be properly thought to emerge inevitably from
naturalistic sources. Nonetheless, evolutionary analysis prevents us
from telling stories to ourselves about where morality comes from that
are inconsistent with scientific knowledge about how the human brain
came to be the way it is. Just as no theory of flight can be inconsistent,
in the end, with the theory of gravity, no theory of human behavior,
morality, or norms, no matter how seemingly transcendent, can be in
consistent with the process of evolution.ss
With the underbrush of untenable theories thinned, evolutionary
analysis next reveals under-recognized relationships between all the
behavioral subjects of law's interest. It plays connect-the-dots with
morals, norms, emotions, rationalities, irrationalities, tastes for risk;
and the like, making a coherent picture from an otherwise insuffi
ciently coherent assemblage of data points. Just as the relationship
between the numbers 105, 30, and 2000 cannot be fully appreciated
without reference to multiples of 5, the lowest common denominator,
seemingly disparate human behaviors can be neither fully appreciated

53. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 27, at 1226-41.
54. Dennett introduced the metaphor of evolutionary perspectives as universal acid in
DENNETI, supra note 9, at 61-84.
55. This is not to say that evolutionary theory is categorically beyond scientific chal
lenge. No scientific theory ever is. It is to say, however, that the evolutionary sciences are
far more empirically and theoretically robust than current alternatives, and that any persua
sive theory of norm formulation (for example) that is inconsistent with them bears the heavy
burden of replacing them with a more accurate and systematically coherent theory.
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nor reconciled without reference to psychological and generative
commonalities most visible in the light of evolutionary analysis.
In short, evolutionary analysis provides a deeper, more accurate,
more contextualized, and more nuanced framework for understanding
the interplay between various psychological predispositions influenc
ing behavior relevant to law. Its window on the mind opens a view on
human behavior as the product of a brain that evolutionary processes
have functionally specialized to perceive and process information in
ways that tended to yield adaptive solutions to problems encountered
in ancestral environments of evolutionary adaptation. This, in turn,
yields at least three implications.
The first implication is that some norms of behavior relevant to
law evolve not simply because they are more efficient than others, but
because they are more appealing to the human brain than others - as
a function of their effects in deep ancestral environments. Evolution
ary analysis reveals the under-credited influence of visceral emotions
\vith narrowly-tailored evolutionary significance on rational reflection
and moral sentiments, from empathy to moralistic aggression.56 Mor
alistic outrage at having been cheated by someone, for example, or at
seeing someone else being cheated, can be seen to be no less a biologi
cal adaptation than our thumbs. The inquiry into what makes moral
behavior feel good and immoral behavior feel bad (in broad brush) is
analogous in important ways to investigating what makes sugar taste
sweet and cardboard taste bad. (Answer: the former is an evolved,
species-typical perception that biases eating behavior toward sources
rich in energy usable by human physiology.) Once this is recognized,
it is but a short step to resolving many otherwise seemingly puzzling
preferences (for spiteful litigation, for example) or supposed irration
alities. These are sometimes, undoubtedly, the modern manifestations
of historically adaptive psychological predispositions that are, in
much-changed current environments, maladaptive. That they may
lead us to seemingly irrational behavior in a novel environment does
not make them inherently irrational or inexplicable.57
A second implication is that evolutionary analysis provides an en
tirely new tool of legal history. Because human brains, as a function of
evolutionary processes, must inevitably share some historically adap
tive information-processing pathways (emotions, moral fundaments,
norms, and the like) that bias behavior, we would expect to see the
imprints of these on human legal systems, cross-culturally. And, in

56. Richard Posner begins to explore the relevance of this in POSNER, supra note 9 (at
33-35. As an example, Amy Wax argues that an evolutionary perspective on reciprocity
norms is useful in helping us understand public attitudes about welfare p�ograms. See Amy
Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming summer 2000).
57. See Jones, supra note 39.
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fact, we do, although we rarely acknowledge the connection between
evolutionary processes and legal artifacts. This is not to suggest, of
course, that either the specific substance of law (say, the estate tax
rate) or the specific procedure (of probating a will, for example) are
directly traceable to psychological predispositions toward those pre
cise legal requirements. It is to suggest that the general sentiments at
the root of many human legal manifestations - and of our concep
tions of law itself - are non-random.
It is not coin-flipping odds, for example, how the legal systems
tend to provide that the property of an intestate decedent will flow
(i.e., to relatives by marriage and blood, in priority according to de
grees of consanguinity). Nor is the very notion of property coherent
without reference to evolved psychological predispositions to acquire
and use, or to share with some and exclude others. An evolutionary
analysis - attending to ancestral effects of variations in normative re
actions - helps explain why, for example, within all known human
cultures, rape is proscribed to a degree disproportionate to other
forms of physical harm that do not implicate reproductive capacities.58
Just as history can provide important context for understanding geo
political boundaries, and the future behavior of states, evolutionary
analysis can provide important context for understanding the legal
landscape, and the ways in which it may develop in the future. We will
miss something important if we fail to see the connection between
biologically influenced norms and the existence of, content of, and
support for legal systems.
A third implication concerns efforts to predict variations in the ef
fectiveness of different efforts to move human behavior with the tools
of law. At the moment, we have neither a comprehensive nor a par
ticularly accurate theory to explain why and predict when people will
conform to certain legal prescriptions more than to others. Econom
ics, certainly, helps us understand that, in many cases, people will be
have as if they are cost-benefit maximizers of personal utility. But
economics, alone, provides neither a basis for understanding why per
sonal utility has the content it does (that is, it has no predictive theory
of what people's tastes will be), nor a basis for predicting the strong
emotional content to much human behavior relevant to law. Neither
psychology nor sociology, unsupplemented by behavioral biology, can
suffice to remedy this shortcoming. Evolutionary analysis can help.
For example, it seems to me that a principle derivable from biol
ogy, which might usefully be termed The Law of Law's Leverage, can
provide tangible purchase for efforts to explain and predict those as-

58. See Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Preven
tion, supra note 27; Owen D. Jones, Law, Biology, and Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 151 (2000).
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pects of human behavior that will be most sensitive and least sensitive
to changes in legal rules. It consists of two symmetrical propositions.59

Proposition One:

The cost of using law to reduce the inci
dence of any behavior will correlate positively with the
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu
tionary adaptation.
Proposition Two: The cost of using law to increase the inci
dence of any behavior will correlate negatively with the
extent to which that behavior was adaptive for its bear
ers, on average, in the relevant environment of evolu
tionary adaptation.
This Law of Law's Leverage predicts, for example, that it will gen
erally be less costly to shift a behavior in ways that tended to increase
reproductive success in ancestral environments than it will be to shift
behavior in ways that tended to decrease reproductive success in an
cestral environments. The malleability of a behavior in reaction to
changes in law - and therefore, to a great extent, the commensurate
cost of trying to change the behavior - will tend to vary as a function
of the extent to which the behavior was historically adaptive. Put an
other way, the slope of the demand curve for historically adaptive be
havior that is now deemed to be socially (in some cases even individu
ally) undesirable will be far steeper (reflecting less sensitivity to price)
than the corresponding slope for behavior that was comparatively less
adaptive in ancestral environments. Importantly, this rule will tend to
hold, even when the costs that an individual actually and foreseeably
incurs in behaving in a historically adaptive way exceed the presently
foreseeable benefits of such behavior.60

CONCLUSION
Like the man who searches for lost keys only under the lamppost,
because the light is better there, modem disciplines have tended to fo
cus their efforts to understand human behavior on uniquely human
cultural processes - because they are readily observable. Law has
followed suit. But while the uniqueness of our species is obvious, it is
neither physically nor behaviorally absolute. Relentlessly abrasive,

59. I suppose I could combine these into one rule. But clarity recommended bifurca
tion, at least for the time being.
60. This idea is explored at greater length in Jones, Law, Behavioral Economics, and
Evolution, supra note 39. Legal contexts in which the Law of Law's Leverage will be par
ticularly relevant will be those aspects of, for example, constitutional law, criminal law, fam
ily law, torts, property, and contracts that involve such things as: mating, fairness, homicide;
child-rearing, status-seeking, property and territory, resource accumulation, sexuality (in
cluding infidelity and jealousy), speech, privacy, empathy, and crimes of passion.
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systematic, and (emphatically) knowable evolutionary processes have
wrought in us, as in all other animals, a behavioral repertoire of pre
dispositions. That natural selection has afforded our brain unparal
leled self-consciousness and rational ability should not obscure the un
avoidable conclusion that our fundamental emotions, moralities,
norms, and predilections - many of which underlie behavior of criti
cal importance to law - often reflect adaptations to deep ancestral
environments and conditions.
Against this background, The Great Disruption provides something
far more significant than simply arguing for the importance of social
capital to a thriving economy, and the importance of reconstituting so
cial order as we move from an industrial to information age society.
(Though those, themselves, are observations worth careful study.) By
exploring how predispositions toward social order can evolve, The
Great Disruption provides a valuable example of how integrating
evolutionary perspectives on human brain and behavior can further
the analysis of important social and political problems. Because so
much of that integration focuses on the evolution of human moral sen
timents, and because an understanding of morality is central to compe
tent legal thinking, The Great Disruption therefore offers law some
important insights.
For example, we should be asking not whether our moral senti
ments could have been influenced by evolutionary history, but how it
could be otherwise. Morality cannot simply be some arbitrary cultural
artifact that happened to gain a foothold because some tabula-rasa
human mind, in some socio-cultural milieu, invented it. Nor are our
morals and norms the glorious and deduced end product of objectively
indisputable ratiocinations. For whatever else they may be, morals
and norms are fundamentally subsets of human behavioral predisposi
tions, which are in turn a product of human information-processing
patterns, which are in tum a function of human brain structure, which
is in tum a product of evolutionary processes. This has a variety of
implications for the way we think, not only about the relationship be
tween law and morality, but also about the relationship between law
and behavior.
Viewed in this light it is clear that morals and norms can remain
divorced from biology through only the most artificial and disciplinar
ily jealous, xenophobic, and acontextual machinations. While it would
be absurd to imagine that biology could alone provide a complete ex
planation for human moral behavior, it is no less equally absurd to
imagine that moral behavior can be understood, in any deep way,
without knowledge of the pathways and principles by which the
information-processing, behavior-biasing patterns of the human brain
came, through knowable evolutionary processes, to be as they are. An
extreme view? Hardly. Science knows of no way by which it could be
otherwise. Extremity is defined by the contrary assumption: that the
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brain has somehow evolved beyond the reach of the evolutionary pro
cesses that built it. It is therefore mistaken and misleading, maybe
more, to champion any theory of human norm or morality formation
independent of the effects of evolution on the human brain.
Francis Fukuyama clearly sees all this. He raises some interesting
questions about the implications, and offers some answers. And while
I don't find all of them persuasive, I am persuaded that he is on the
right track, and that legal thinkers should pay attention to the rich op
portunities evolutionary analysis holds for their own discipline.

